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The scope of the President’s independent war powers is no‐
toriously unclear, and courts are understandably reluctant to
issue constitutional rulings that might deprive the federal gov‐
ernment as a whole of the flexibility needed to respond to crises.
As a result, courts often look for signs that Congress has either
supported or opposed the President’s actions and rest their deci‐
sions on statutory grounds. This is essentially the approach out‐
lined by Justice Jackson in his concurrence in Youngstown.1
For the most part, the Supreme Court has also followed this
approach in deciding executive power issues relating to the
war on terror. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, for example, Justice
O’Connor based her plurality decision, which allowed for mili‐
tary detention of a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan, on
Congress’s September 18, 2001, Authorization for Use of Mili‐
tary Force (AUMF).2 Similarly, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Court grounded its disallowance of the Bush Administration’s
military commission system on what it found to be congres‐
sionally imposed restrictions.3
The Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush4 might seem an
aberration in this regard, but it is not. Although the Court in
Boumediene did rely on the Constitution in holding that the de‐
tainees at Guantanamo have a right to seek habeas corpus re‐
view in U.S. courts, it did not impose any specific restrictions
on the executive’s detention, treatment, or trial of the detain‐
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1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952) (Jack‐
son, J., concurring).
2. See 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (plurality); Pub. L. No. 107‐40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
3. See 548 U.S. 557, 622–25, 627 (2006).
4. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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ees.5 In other words, Boumediene was more about preserving a
role for the courts than about prohibiting the executive from
exercising statutorily conferred authority.
Statutory authority was also a central issue in the much‐
discussed Al‐Marri case in the Fourth Circuit.6 Although the Su‐
preme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision as moot, the
decision still provides an instructive example. Al‐Marri involved
a Qatari citizen, Ali Saleh Kahlah al‐Marri, who came to the
United States on September 10, 2001, and was later arrested and
charged with various counts of fraud.7 Shortly before al‐Marri’s
trial, President Bush designated him an enemy combatant, and
he was moved to military custody.8 As justification for this ac‐
tion, the Bush Administration alleged that al‐Marri was an al
Qaeda sleeper agent who had come to the United States to await
instructions to carry out further attacks after September 11.9
In a closely divided en banc ruling, the Fourth Circuit held
that the executive had the authority to detain al‐Marri but that
it needed to provide him with additional process by which he
could challenge his designation as an enemy combatant.10 The
Supreme Court granted review of the decision in December
2008.11 When briefing the case for the Court, al‐Marri focused
primarily on statutory arguments, saving a fallback constitu‐
tional argument for the end of his brief.12
At the core of al‐Marri’s argument was the contention that, to
find congressional authorization for the military detention,
courts should insist on a clear statement that Congress sup‐
ported the executive’s action.13 Although the Bush Administra‐
tion argued that the AUMF gave it statutory authority to detain
al‐Marri, the AUMF does not mention detention, let alone deten‐

5. See id. at 2277 (“It bears repeating that our opinion does not address the con‐
tent of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.”).
6. Al‐Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated as moot
sub nom. Al‐Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
7. Al‐Marri, 534 F.3d at 219 (Motz, J., concurring).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 220.
10. See id. at 216 (per curiam).
11. Al‐Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008).
12. See Brief for Petitioner, Al‐Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (No. 08‐
368), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/b550c7e58f8f54a929_xum6iiq49.pdf.
13. See id. at 15.
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tion of someone apprehended in the United States.14 As a result,
al‐Marri argued that the requisite clear statement was lacking.
The Bush Administration responded to this argument with
the following syllogism: Because the plurality in Hamdi con‐
strued the AUMF to authorize the military detention of enemy
forces as a fundamental incident of waging war, and because
al‐Marri was alleged to be an agent of al Qaeda, which was one
of the enemy groups encompassed by the AUMF, the AUMF
authorized al‐Marri’s detention.15 Based on this reasoning, the
Administration contended that no clearer statement of authori‐
zation was needed.16
Although the Obama Administration rendered this case
moot by deciding to try al‐Marri in a regular criminal court,17
the clear statement issue posed by the case is a recurring one
and thus worth considering. Indeed, it has already come up in
other areas in the war on terror—for example, with respect to
whether the AUMF authorizes warrantless electronic surveil‐
lance of communications, going into and out of the United
States, with alleged members of al Qaeda.18 Moreover, to an
even greater extent than the Bush Administration, the Obama
Administration has grounded its authority in the war on terror
on purported statutory authorization.19
There have been both liberal and conservative claims about
the potential role of a clear statement requirement in the con‐
text of executive war powers. On the liberal side, some com‐

14. Compare Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 27–28, Al‐Marri, 129 S. Ct.
680 (No. 08‐368), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2008/0responses/
2008‐0368.resp.pdf, with Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107‐
40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
15. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 14, at 27–29.
16. See id. at 26–27 (distinguishing cases that applied a clear statement rule).
17. See U.S. Supreme Court rejects terror detainee’s challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/world/americas/06iht‐06detain.20657950.html.
18. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 373–80 (3d ed. 2009) (excerpting arguments for and against
the executive’s legal authority to engage in warrantless electronic surveillance).
19. See, e.g., Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Deten‐
tion Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo
Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08‐442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memo‐re‐det‐auth.pdf.
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mentators such as Cass Sunstein20 and judges such as Justice
Souter have contended, in effect, that a clear statement is neces‐
sary for congressional authorization of executive wartime ac‐
tion whenever liberty interests are at stake.21 There are several
problems with this approach.
As an initial matter, executive wartime actions inherently af‐
fect liberty. People are bombed and shot and captured. These
actions necessarily have substantial effects on liberty, and yet
there is often no expectation, by either the courts or the politi‐
cal branches, that specific congressional authorization is re‐
quired. A clear statement approach premised merely on liberty
interests would therefore be unduly broad. While one could
attempt to avoid this problem by referring only to “constitu‐
tionally significant liberty interests,” this approach simply
raises the difficult constitutional issues that a statutory clear
statement approach seeks to avoid.
In any event, even if some liberty interests do seem to sup‐
port a clear statement requirement, considerations of executive
authority might well push in the opposite direction, in favor of
a broad construction of congressional delegations. Indeed, a
number of Supreme Court decisions suggest that even when
liberty interests are at stake, congressional delegations of au‐
thority to the executive are construed broadly when relating to
areas of independent executive authority, including the Com‐
mander‐in‐Chief power.22 A liberty approach offers little guid‐
ance for resolving these competing constitutional claims.
A general liberty approach also does not line up well with
wartime precedent and practice. In its 1942 decision Ex parte
Quirin, which involved Nazi saboteurs tried by a military com‐
mission, the Supreme Court did not require a clear statement of
congressional authorization.23 The Court made this determina‐
tion even though the saboteurs were deprived of liberty, and

20. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663,
2669–71 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security:
Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 46.
21. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 543–45 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
22. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772 (1996); Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 291–92 (1981).
23. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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even though at least one of them was a U.S. citizen.24 Similarly,
in Hamdi, the Court did not require that the AUMF specifically
mention a power to detain, even though liberty interests were
again obviously at stake.25 Indeed, dozens of U.S. citizens were
held uncontroversially in the United States as POWs during
World War II after being captured fighting for Germany and It‐
aly. There was no clear statement of authorization for their de‐
tention, just a general declaration of war and authorization of
force.26 And of course, non‐U.S. citizens often have been held as
prisoners in this way, both inside and outside the United States,
despite the absence of specific detention legislation.
On the conservative side of the debate, some commentators
such as Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule and
judges such as Justice Thomas have argued that courts should
simply defer to executive determinations that the benefits of
wartime action outweigh the costs to liberty, at least absent a
clear indication of congressional disapproval.27 In addition to
allowing for fewer checks and balances than many people be‐
lieve are necessary in this context, this deferential approach
also does not fit the precedent well. It is difficult for advocates
of the deferential approach to distinguish, for example, the
Youngstown decision during the Korean War,28 the Pentagon
Papers decision during the Vietnam War,29 and the Hamdan de‐
cision during the war on terror,30 none of which deferred to the
executive’s balancing.
In sum, the clear statement issue is more complicated than ei‐
ther the liberal or conservative approaches suggest. Liberty in‐
terests by themselves are not dispositive, but neither is defer‐
ence to the executive. Precedent and practice suggest instead
24. Id. at 20–22, 29–31.
25. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality).
26. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2106–07 n.271 (2005); see also In re Ter‐
rito, 156 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1946) (“[I]t is immaterial to the legality of peti‐
tioner’s detention as a prisoner of war by American military authorities whether
petitioner is or is not a citizen of the United States of America.”).
27. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 580–84 (Thomas, J., dissenting); ERIC A. POSNER &
ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS
15–18 (2007).
28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
29. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
30. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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that courts discern congressional approval or disapproval
based on a number of contextual considerations. These consid‐
erations include whether Congress has attempted to regulate in
the area, the consistency of the executive action with historical
practice, the extent to which the executive action relates to in‐
dependent executive authority, and the degree to which unilat‐
eral executive action appears to be functionally necessary.
A variety of historical episodes illustrate the relevance of
these contextual factors. For example, the Supreme Court held
during the Civil War that President Lincoln acted lawfully in
ordering a naval blockade of Southern ports after the onset of
hostilities.31 In that case, Congress had not attempted to regu‐
late this issue prior to Lincoln’s action and later approved the
action retroactively, a naval blockade was part of what was his‐
torically done in wartime, Lincoln’s action was a strategic mili‐
tary decision and thus related to the Commander‐in‐Chief
power, and unilateral executive action seemed functionally
necessary given that the threat to the Union was so signifi‐
cant.32 Similarly, it seems unlikely anyone would claim that
President Roosevelt needed a clear statement of authorization
to detain hundreds of thousands of POWs during WWII, even
though doing so affected their liberty. As in the case of Lin‐
coln’s naval blockade, Congress had not attempted to regulate
the specific issue, the detention was consistent with historical
practice in wartime, it involved interactions with the enemy,
and it seemed functionally necessary.
In essence, the same reasoning applies to the decision in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld for individuals who, like Hamdi, were cap‐
tured during fighting in Afghanistan. Importantly, the plurality
in Hamdi made clear that its decision rested on the contextual
factors of the case.33 In particular, the plurality noted that the
government was seeking to detain “an individual who, it al‐
leges, was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United
States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged
in an armed conflict against the United States’ there,” and the
plurality made clear that it was answering “only the narrow

31. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 662–65 (1863).
32. See id.
33. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (plurality).
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question before us: whether the detention of citizens falling
within that definition is authorized.”34
One could argue that Congress had in fact regulated the is‐
sue in Hamdi with the 1971 Non‐Detention Act, a one‐sentence
statute that provides: “No citizen shall be imprisoned or oth‐
erwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act
of Congress.”35 But it is far from clear that the statute applies to
military detention of enemy combatants, and its legislative his‐
tory suggests that it was instead designed to avoid roundups of
civilians as had occurred with the internment of Japanese‐
Americans in World War II.36 As noted above, a number of U.S.
citizens were held as POWs in the United States during World
War II after having fought for Germany or Italy, and this prac‐
tice was uncontroversial, so it seems unlikely that Congress
was sub silentio outlawing it in the 1971 Non‐Detention Act. In
any event, Congress certainly had not regulated this issue in
any detail, but had simply indicated that a statute was needed,
a requirement the AUMF arguably satisfied.
The situation in Hamdan, the military commissions case, was
more difficult for the executive. Although it involved interac‐
tion with the enemy, Congress had regulated in the area, or at
least so thought the Supreme Court.37 More importantly, the
Administration was attempting to use a military trial process
for nontraditional combatants, so the historical practice was
less solid. The case for functional necessity was also relatively
weak because no one had actually been tried in the commis‐
sions by the time of the case and others in similar circum‐
stances were being tried in regular courts.
The warrantless surveillance issue is similarly problematic
for the executive, because Congress had extensively regulated
in the area with the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) and had expressly envisioned in that statute the situa‐
tion of wartime. The functional necessity was also unclear,
given that the FISA court almost always grants requested war‐
rants, and the Administration had already sought and obtained
34. See id.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006).
36. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 2106–07 n.271; Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, The War on Terrorism: International Law, Clear Statement Re‐
quirements, and Constitutional Design, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2683, 2696 (2005).
37. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 579–80 (2006).
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changes to FISA after September 11 that made the warrant
process even less restrictive.38
What do these considerations suggest about Al‐Marri, assum‐
ing it had been decided by the Supreme Court? Although a
close call, the imposition of a clear statement requirement ap‐
pears to be justified in that context, though not precisely for the
reasons advanced by the petitioner.
The petitioner’s brief and an amicus brief filed in support of
the petitioner argued for a clear statement requirement for any
military detention of someone who is a lawful resident in the
United States.39 They framed the requirement this way to avoid
the Quirin and Hamdi precedents, which did not involve resi‐
dents of the United States, while at the same time going be‐
yond the famous Civil War‐era decision Ex parte Milligan,40
which, while limiting the military’s detention and trial author‐
ity, involved only U.S. citizens. This framing, however, is
rather artificial. It is not clear why the treatment of enemy
agents must vary depending on whether they sneak into the
United States, as in Quirin, or come here under false pretext, as
is alleged for al‐Marri. Indeed, the petitioner’s argument would
mean there would have been no power to detain militarily the
September 11 hijackers themselves, if one of them had sur‐
vived, because they were residents of the United States. Nor is
it clear why the liberty interests are higher in the Al‐Marri case
than in Hamdi, which involved the detention of a U.S. citizen.
In addition, some of the clear statement precedent that al‐Marri
relied upon, such as Ex parte Endo,41 involved concededly loyal
residents, not alleged enemy agents. Milligan is closer to al‐
Marri’s situation, but there Congress was found to have spe‐
cifically regulated the detentions. It was also not clear that the
petitioners in Milligan were really acting under the direction

38. See Curtis Bradley et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, at 42, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18650.
39. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 19; Brief of Constitutional Law
Scholars in Support of Petitioner at 14, Al‐Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545
(2009) (No. 08–368), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/bf07441f1a77dca0a3_vnm
6bxtv2.pdf.
40. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
41. 323 U.S. 283, 294 (1944).
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and control of the Confederacy,42 whereas it is alleged that al‐
Marri was acting as an agent of al Qaeda.43
Nevertheless, the contextual considerations outlined above
support a requirement of more express congressional authori‐
zation for the Al‐Marri situation, for several reasons. First, his‐
torical practice is less helpful to the executive in the Al‐Marri
context than in Hamdi: When one moves away from individuals
connected to the fighting in Afghanistan, one is moving to‐
wards something more like indefinite detention, not just deten‐
tion during active combat. To then apply nontraditional deten‐
tion authority to individuals residing in U.S. territory is an
additional step that further suggests the desirability of multi‐
branch deliberation.
Second, considerations of functional necessity also seem
low here: al‐Marri was already going to be tried in civilian
court, and he was a class of one in terms of so‐called enemy
combatants currently detained in the United States.44 More‐
over, this class has had a total of only three people during the
war on terror, one of whom (Hamdi) was released and the
other of whom (Padilla) was eventually tried in a regular ci‐
vilian court. With these facts, it is far from clear that a domes‐
tic military detention authority was necessary in order to fight
the war on terror effectively.
Third, there is also a reasonable argument that Congress had
already attempted to regulate the al‐Marri situation in the Pa‐
triot Act because the Act contains provisions that allow for de‐
tention of alien residents suspected of being connected with
terrorism, while also disallowing indefinite detention.45 Fourth,
the amount of time that had elapsed since the enactment of the
AUMF is also relevant, both because a variety of issues have
arisen that probably were not anticipated by Congress and be‐
42. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy
Combatants, and Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93,
123–24 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
43. See John Schwartz, Accused Qaeda Sleeper Agent in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2009, at A16.
44. See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Will Give Qaeda Suspect a Civilian
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A1 (noting that, when he was moved to civilian
custody, al‐Marri was “the only enemy combatant to be held on American soil”).
45. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re‐
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107‐56, § 412(a), 115 Stat. 272, 351 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2006)).
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cause the executive branch has had plenty of time to work with
Congress to obtain more specific legislation.
Finally, although the executive could argue that the deten‐
tion relates to a Commander‐in‐Chief power—interacting with
the enemy—and that Congress had identified al Qaeda as the
enemy, the enemy class is much more uncertain here than in
traditional wars. The al Qaeda organization is a decentralized
and amorphous collection of groups with no clear chain of
command, and affiliation with that organization is both non‐
obvious and varies in extent from individual to individual.
Pushing this issue to Congress would likely produce more
guidance for the courts about how to define the enemy class, a
difficult issue once one moves beyond a traditional battlefield
context. To put it differently, there is a good case here for a
“democracy‐forcing” construction of the AUMF, similar to
what the Court did in Hamdan.46
What this analysis ultimately suggests is that deciding is‐
sues of executive war powers requires contextual and prag‐
matic judgment rather than resort to abstract classifications,
whether they are liberal or conservative in character, some‐
thing that Justice Jackson recognized in his justifiably famous
Youngstown concurrence. Jackson’s concurrence is now so
celebrated that it is becoming almost de rigueur among legal
academics to criticize it, and some aspects of his three‐tiered
framework are certainly vulnerable to criticism.47 Neverthe‐
less, as a starting point for the application of judicial review in
cases involving challenges to executive war powers, it still has
much to commend it.

46. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the
Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 322, 322 (2007).
47. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474320.

